Applied to the House of Lords

The House of Lords, suitably reformed, has a continuing and important role to play as a second, independent Revising Chamber which can ask the House of Commons to think again and has the power to delay, but not ultimately to frustrate, decisions of the House of Commons.

To fulfill this role, and indeed to be genuinely part of a democratic Parliament at all, the House of Lords needs to represent the people, and therefore to be an elected House. A non-elected Parliament is almost a contradiction in terms.

The reformed House should therefore not be made up of unelected hereditary peers and other peers whom Governments can appoint in order to assure themselves of a majority, thus frustrating the main purpose of such a House. Continuing to appoint Lords in this way, so as to duplicate the Commons, is bringing the House of Lords into dysfunction and eventually into disrepute.

Neither should members of the reformed House of Lords be entitled to remain members throughout their lives. On the contrary, members of the House should be elected by the people for a fixed term of years, perhaps six years, with sensitive arrangements for transition from the present membership. 

As with the House of Commons, there would be considerable merit in using a system which combines Constituencies with Total Representation (TR) for electing members of the reformed House. Apart from being a good system in itself this would help to restore the long-lost link between the Lords and the electorate across the country. 

The electoral system and other arrangements should be developed so as to provide maximum assurance that the reformed House does not become a replica of the House of Commons or another rubber-stamping subordinate of the Government of the day.

A new Act of Reform would broadly confirm the existing functions of the House of Lords, as defined in the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, including its power to propose changes to most legislation and delay its passage but not ultimately to frustrate the will of the Commons.

Membership

As already suggested, the reformed House of Lords would consist entirely of members elected by the people for fixed terms of years, and representing the people who have elected them, with sensitive arrangements for transition from the present membership.

Some commentators argue that we need to retain some appointed Lords to ensure the presence of experts. This is a spurious argument. The House of Lords was never intended to be a House of experts. Governments and Select Committees of both Houses can and frequently do draw on expert advice from outside. Parliaments exist democratically to represent the ordinary citizen, not to create oligarchies and establishments that further distance the representatives from the represented.

There are, however, two categories of people who have traditionally been members of the House of Lords and whose special status could if desired, be recognised, with suitable modifications, within the new arrangements. These are: Law Lords and Bishops.

The challenge would be to give these dignitaries, few in number, a special status within the new chamber without doing violence to the Montesquieu principle of separation of powers between the three arms of State – Legislature, Executive and Judiciary – and without sacrificing the principle that the new House of Lords should consist entirely of elected members.

The solution could lie in providing for a number of non-voting Judicial and Religious Assessors who would be allowed to participate actively in the deliberations of the new House of Lords and its Committees but would not have the right to vote.

The Judicial Assessors would preferably be members of the Judiciary with real and current Bench experience, so that a direct link between the sovereign people and the judiciary would be maintained. The Supreme Court might delegate a small number of judges from the practising Judiciary to sit in the Lords on this basis and contribute as appropriate to its deliberations for a certain limited period – say six years. After these six years, they would be rotated and replaced by others.

Similarly with Bishops and / or other religious leaders, the Queen as Sovereign could appoint a small number of these to sit as Assessors in the new House on a similar, non-voting basis, again for a period of six years, after which they too would be rotated.

Arrangements on these lines, though by no means essential, could neatly solve the problem of how to replace the Law Lords and Bishops, thus maintaining the gravitas of the second Chamber.  Such arrangements could also help in the vital task of restoring social cohesion in the UK, which has been threatened by social and ideological trends from within and as a result of an unprecedented scale of immigration from without. There is a compelling case for continuing to have within the House of Lords people with long experience of important areas of the public and private sectors. 

Elections to the new Chamber

A system combining Constituencies with Total Representation (TR) would work well for electing members of the reformed House of Lords as well as the House of Commons. How might such a system be applied in practice to the Lords?

Here, as in the Commons, there would be a range of options. The numbers should be seen as an illustrative guide, and not set in stone.  

The new House of Lords could have (say) 300 members.

• 200 of these could be Regional Lords (RLs), elected like Constituency MPs through a Constituency FPTP system, region by region.

• Each House of Lords Constituency or Electoral Region would consist of three contiguous constituencies out of the 600 House of Commons constituencies due to be introduced from 2018. This would remove the need for a whole new exercise by the Boundary Commissions to determine Lords Regions and would vastly simplify the ongoing tasks of organisation and administration. The UK already has far too many conflicting administrative geographies and boundaries which are a major source of waste and inefficiency.

• The remaining Members of the reformed Chamber (up to, say, 100) would be Party Lords (PLs). It would be a matter for decision how many of these there should be. If the chosen number were 100, that would mean a ratio of Regional to Party Lords of 67:33. The proportion of Party Lords would then be higher than those discussed earlier for Party MPs in the Commons, thereby giving a significantly higher weighting than in the Commons to “wasted” votes. This might, however, be considered appropriate for a more independent second Chamber with less Party whipping (see further below). It would significantly reduce the likelihood that any single Party in the reformed House of Lords would have an overall majority. It might also correct to some extent for the relatively low weighting of Party MPs (PMPs) envisaged for the Commons.

• As in the House of Commons, Party Lord quotas of seats would be allocated to individual Parties in proportion to their shares in the aggregate of “wasted” votes they had obtained, and the Party quotas of seats would then be allocated to the individual candidates within each Party who had personally won most seats in the election, in the same way as described for Party MPs in the House of Commons.

Provision for Independent or Cross-Bench Lords

Independent or “cross-bench” Peers have traditionally contributed much to the work of the House of Lords. It would be good to enable this tradition to continue.

To that end, Parliament might agree to strengthen and codify an existing, un-codified tradition whereby all members of the House of Lords, whatever the Party banner may be under which they have been elected, are encouraged to assume a degree of independence, seeing their main allegiance as being to Queen (in accordance with the oath sworn by Members of both Houses of Parliament and the more recent House of Lords Code of Conduct) and acting in case of need according to their own consciences and judgments of the public interest rather than following Party lines. The Office of Party Whip should preferably be abolished, as should the central aisle, so as to convey that all members, once elected, become “cross-benchers” first and foremost. 

Whether or not that can be achieved, one consequence which may still be seen as regrettable of an electoral system on the lines proposed, is that independent or “cross-bench” candidates who wish as a matter of principle to forswear affiliation or allegiance to any of the political Parties, would have a lesser chance of being elected than candidates who are so affiliated. Such candidates might include aspiring people with professional backgrounds or experience who could bring much value to the House.

Candidates of this kind, though they would lack the back-up support which Parties may provide, would in other respects have a similar chance with Party-affiliated candidates of being elected as Regional Lords, especially if there was a good public understanding of the different natures of the two Houses. They could stand in the regions as Independent Candidates.

Other things being equal, however, they would have no chance of winning seats as Party Lords when the “wasted” votes are allocated to Parties. So the electoral system could be seen as being biased against potentially excellent candidates who wish to forswear any Party affiliation or allegiance.

It might be necessary to accept this as being a consequence of having an elected House with good representation of the people.

Candidates wishing to run as independents could, however, improve their chances of winning Party Lord seats by teaming up or forming pre-alliances with other like-minded independents. Alternatively, they might be able to form a “strictly non-partisan” Party exclusively consisting of candidates who wish to forswear affiliation or allegiance to any of the political Parties and are committed to act and vote individually according to their consciences and perceptions of the public interest, drawing on their professional expertise and experience. That would be the Party’s (sole) declared policy and position. Such a Party could even prove to be a significant force in the reformed House of Lords as well as helping the new House to attract professional candidates similar to those who have contributed so much as cross-benchers in the present House.

 Constituency sizes and responsibilities

As already implied, an electoral system for the reformed House of Lords which combines Constituency and TR elements would require regions or constituencies to be defined.

Under the proposals already discussed, the reformed House would have only one-third as many Regional or Constituency Lords as there would be Constituency MPs in the Commons, representing only one-third as many regions or constituencies. Each House of Lords region or constituency would comprise three House of Commons constituencies.

This would not be a problem but rather a strength of the new system. Regional Lords would not have the same obligations which Constituency MPs have to maintain close contact at all time with their constituencies. They would not be obliged to set up “surgeries” similar to those of Constituency MPs. Their contacts would be more a matter of gauging the political temperatures of their regions and using these to inform the deliberations of the House. The roles of MPs and Lords would complement, rather than duplicate, each other. This in itself would add to the value of the Lords as a Revising Chamber.

Frequency of elections

Members of the reformed House of Lords could be elected for terms of six years. Once the new system is up and running, elections for the whole House could take place every six years. This period would be fixed. Alternatively, elections for half the members could take place every three years. This period too would be fixed. In contrast with the Commons, the House of Lords would not be able to dissolve itself.

By-elections

If a Regional Lord dies or resigns, a by-election would be initiated and moved by an appropriate House Committee within two months of the death or resignation of the Lord concerned.

If a Party Lord dies or resigns, the next in line on the Party list of the preceding election – in other words, the previously unsuccessful Party candidate who had won the most votes in that election - would accede automatically.

Attendance and remuneration

Members of the House of Lords would be obliged to observe certain rules of attendance and would therefore be paid salaries and expenses. These would be fixed and revised from time to time by a Committee of the House of Commons, presided over by the Clerk of the Parliaments, to ensure neutrality and adequate consultation between the two Houses.

Expected results from such a system

It would not be especially useful to try to predict or simulate the results of the elections to the House of Lords under a system such as that proposed above. It is clear, however, that the composition of the reformed House of Lords will seldom, if ever, correspond exactly to that of the House of Commons.

There are two reasons for this. First, the relative weightings proposed for Regional Lords and Party Lords would differ from those for Constituency and Party MPs in the Commons. Second, the timing of elections to the two Houses is unlikely to coincide.

A further consideration is that the age and maturity of the new Lords (if a potential minimum age-bar is implemented) would make them less dependent on their Parties and less inclined to bow to Party lines. The possible presence of Independent Lords, likewise on the basis discussed earlier, would similarly help to give the reformed House of Lords a different and distinctive voice.

The greater independence which the House of Lords would have as a result of all these factors should enhance the value of their revising function. The debates in the Lords would continue to command respect and attention by the House of Commons and the public at large.

Transitional arrangements

Finally, it would be important to implement the transition from the present House of Lords to a wholly elected chamber in such a way as to relieve a possible constitutional limbo and smooth the path of reform.

One way of easing the process would be to start by electing just half the members of the reformed House through the new, TR-based constituency system. 100 Regional Lords and 50 Party Lords could be elected in this way for the first six-year term.

The remaining half of the initial members could be internally elected by the members of the present House. Following the precedent set by Tony Blair and Lord Cranborne when reducing the number of Hereditary Peers, members of the present House could elect from among themselves 150 Lords (both hereditary and life-peers) who would stay behind. These Members too could continue to serve for six years to ensure continuity and help initiate their new, elected counterparts. 

Six years later, the first full national election of 300 Lords (200 Regional Lords and 100 Party Lords) would take place, producing a wholly elected chamber.

Alternatively, if it were decided that elections for half the members of the reformed House should take place every three years, the initial cohort of 150 internally elected peers could serve for three years and a national election for their successors (whose terms would last six years) could take place at that point.

The Clerk of the Parliaments could be tasked, with help from some members of both Houses, to decide which 100 Regional Constituencies chosen from north to south would be the first half to hold elections

A remaining question is what would best be done with the remaining Life Peers and Hereditary Peers who are not elected in this way but would like to continue as Members of the House.

There is a simple, creative answer. The political Parties, which choose, delegate, or appoint their candidates for election in the regional constituencies, could give priority to deserving sitting Peers within their Parties. These Peers would then have a chance of remaining in the reformed Chamber as Regional Lords or as Party Lords within the Party lists. Even if they failed to capture regional seats, their efforts would be rewarded if they score highly in the regions and thus propel themselves to the top of their Party lists within the TR system. Their chances of acceding to the posts of Party Lords would depend as much on their own reputations and canvassing efforts as on the support of their Parties. 

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